On April 6, 2024, Jon Jefferson Tan reported on an interview of former NBA player Jason Caffey by Scoop Jackson. Mr. Caffey had enjoyed a solid eight-year NBA career from 1995-06 through 2002-03. Pertinent to the issue we will discuss, Mr. Caffey spent his first two seasons and change with the Chicago Bulls, winning championships in both seasons (1995-96 and 1996-97) before being traded mid-way through the Bulls 1997-98 championship season (talk about bad timing). After spending the next two full seasons on underwhelming Golden State Warriors squads, Mr. Caffey moved on to the Milwaukee Bucks, where he played a key role on their 2000-01 Eastern Conference Finals squad. Having been a member of three Chicago Bulls championship teams and one good Milwaukee Bucks squad (the Bucks declined during Mr. Caffey’s final two seasons with the team and in the NBA), I suppose he is well-qualified to do what I am not sure anyone had done before: Compare the 1996-98 Chicago Bulls to the 2000-01 Bucks.

(Before continuing, note that I am relying on Mr. Tan’s account of what Mr. Caffey said in his interview. I have not listened to the interview myself.)

The 2000-01 Bucks came one game short of the NBA Finals, losing to the Eastern Conference Champion Philadelphia 76ers in a hard-fought seven game series. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Mr. Caffey looks back on the series with regret and the feeling that his Bucks should have won. I share his thoughts as quoted by Mr. Tan:

It bothered the hell out of me because I felt like that team had more talent than the Chicago Bulls team. I mean, you had Tim Thomas on that team. You had Ray Allen, you got Big Dog, you got Sam Cassell, straight up scores [sic].

More talent than the three championship Bulls teams of the late 90s is high praise, especially when we consider that the 1995-96 Bulls, which went 72-10 in the regular season and 15-3 in the playoffs, have a fair argument for the title of greatest team in NBA history. (I will grant however that the 2000-01 Bucks were far better than the 1998-99 Bulls.) But Mr. Tan, having listened to the interview, described Mr. Caffey’s take as having important context:

Jason Caffey believes the 2001 Milwaukee Bucks were better in terms of being an offensive team.

While I have a feeling that this may be a stretch, it is certainly less of a stretch than suggesting that the 2000-01 Bucks were better than any of the Bulls championship teams in the aggregate (whether we are measuring in terms of results or talent). The 2000-01 Bucks were defensively challenged, but they did feature a high-powered offense, led by guards Ray Allen and Sam Cassell and small forward Glenn “Big Dog” Robinson (Tim Thomas was something of a super sixth man for the Bucks). As readers of my site will know, there are ways of conducting cross-season comparisons to test the merit of Mr. Caffey’s assertion that the Bucks were at least a match for the late 90s Bulls on offense.

Setting Up Our Survey

My favorite method of conducting cross-season offense comparisons is relative offensive rating. Offensive rating refers to points per 100 possessions. The “per 100 possessions” takes pace of play out of the equation to some extent. Of course, offensive rating does not complete the circuit. In recent years, the NBA has been regularly setting new single-season records for offensive rating. In the early 2000s, the NBA posted some of the lowest offensive league-wide offensive ratings since the league began tracking turnovers in 1973-74, with 1998-99 and 2003-04 standing out on the offensive futility index. We can account for this to some degree by adding relative offensive rating to the analysis. To find a team’s relative offensive rating, we take its actual offensive rating and subtract from that the league-wide offensive rating for the season in question. While this does not necessarily tell us whether team A or team B would have had a more potent offense in some mythical universe where teams from different seasons or eras could go head-to-head, it does give us a stable starting point for evaluating how strong they were against their actual competition in their given league environment.

Before proceeding, there are two additional caveats with my method worth noting:

First: I recently read a provocative 2017 essay by Justin Jacobs titled Analyzing NBA Possession Models. He presented a lengthy argument that the NBA often over-estimates real possessions, which in turn would have the effect of depressing offensive ratings. Moreover, he argued that the effect varies from year-to-year and team-to-team. If the NBA’s possession model is unreliable, so too are our offensive and relative offensive rating stats. For the purpose of our survey, we will go with what the official stats say about possessions, but readers who want to take a deeper dive will enjoy Mr. Jacobs’ analysis and arguments. (Note that I take no position at this time regarding the best way to measure possessions.)

Second: The style of play in the NBA changes over time, as evinced by a SIT Sports Analytics essay titled Hoops in Motion: The Evolution of Pace in Basketball. A team that thrived in one league environment may not have thrived in another. In our case, we are looking at four seasons from 1995-96 through 2000-01, so we are not dealing with the difference between those years and today’s historically offense-friendly environment. But…

Third: There is one significant rule change in our sample. The NBA used a shorter three-point line in 1995-96 and 1996-97 than in the latter three seasons in our sample. The shorter three point line had a dramatic effect on three point attempts and percentages (see my discussion in an article focusing on the three-point happy 2001-02 and 2002-03 Boston Celtics). To illustrate the difference the shorter three point line made, let us look at the top two scorers on the three Bulls title teams in our sample.

In 1995-96, Michael Jordan had his best year from behind the arc, hitting a stellar 42.7% of his 3.2 three point attempts per game. He followed that up by shooting 37.4% on 3.6 attempts in 1996-97. When the three point line returned to its original (and current) distance in 1997-98, Mr. Jordan’s three point attempts fell to 1.5 per game and he hit just 23.8%. 1995-96 and 96-97 were Mr. Jordan’s two most prolific seasons in terms of three point attempts and first and third best in terms of percentage. It is worth noting, however, that 1997-98 was an aberration. Mr. Jordan hit 37.6% in 1989-90 on 3.0 attempts per game and 35.2% on 2.9 attempts per game in 1992-93, both of which were played with the longer three point line.

Scottie Pippen saw a similar, albeit less extreme, shift. In both 1995-96 and 1996-97, Mr. Pippen attempted 5.2 three pointers per game, hitting 37.4% and 36.8% respectively. When the line lengthened in 1997-98, Mr. Pippen’s attempts fell to 4.4 and percentage down to 31.8%.

We see some similar shifts in two of the top three scorers on the 2000-01 Bucks. Between 1995-96 and 96-97, Sam Cassell (not then on the Bucks) attempted 3.6 three pointers per game (in just 27.8 minutes), hitting 34.9%. In 1997-98, his minutes went up to 34.7 but his three point attempts fell to 1.1 and his percentage to a career low 18.8% (Mr. Cassell would go on to post several seasons in the mid-to-high 30s in the 2000s). In 1995-96 and 96-97, Glenn Robinson averaged 2.7 three point attempts per game and made them at a 34.5% clip. In 1997-98, his percentage actually improved to 38.5%, but his attempts fell to 1.2.

Sam Cassell backs down Allen Iverson in game 7 of the 2001 Eastern Conference Finals.
Sam Cassell backs down Allen Iverson in game 7 of the 2001 Eastern Conference Finals. Clipped from NBA YouTube Channel.

The 2000-01 Bucks had excellent shooters, most notably Ray Allen who stands as one of the greatest shooters in NBA history and was for a time the NBA’s all time leader in three pointers made (he sits in third as of the publication date of this article), so it is reasonable to consider that their offense may have been even more potent with the shorter three point line in place in the mid-90s (I will note however that Messrs. Cassell and Robinson had subpar seasons from behind the arc in 2000-01).

Comparing the 2000-01 Bucks vs 1995-96, 1996-97, and 1997-98 Chicago Bulls

Without further ado, let us compare the four seasons Mr. Caffey has inspired us to look at.

TeamORtgRORtg
2000-01 Bucks108.4+5.8
1997-98 Bulls107.7+2.7
1996-97 Bulls114.4+7.7
1995-96 Bulls115.2+7.6

To begin, we can set aside the 1997-98 Bulls, which ranked just 8th out of 29 in offensive rating in 1997-98 while being a comparatively stronger 3rd best on defense. The stats do support finding that the 2000-01 Bucks were, in the regular season at least, superior to the Bulls on offense (the Bucks ranked 20th out of 29 on defense in 2000-01 and were 1.6 points per 100 possessions worse than the league average, so offense is an important qualifier). Of course, Mr. Caffey was traded mid-way through the 1997-98 season, so let us focus on the 1995-96 and 1996-97 Bulls.

The Bucks, 96-97 Bulls, and 95-96 Bulls all led the NBA in offensive rating in their respective seasons. But those first two Bulls teams, which happen to be the ones Mr. Caffey was with the Bulls for the entire season, were better relative to their competition than the Bucks. Of course, we do have a caveat. The shorter three point line in 95-96 and 96-97 contributed to better scoring environments — even when compared to 1997-98.

  • 1997-98: 105.0 average offensive rating
  • 1996-97: 106.7 average offensive rating
  • 1995-96: 107.6 average offensive rating

2000-01 saw the worst scoring environment in our sample, we the league-wide offensive rating being just 103.0. (As of April 7, 2026, the league-wide offensive rating in 2025-26 is 115.7.)

Thus, let us look at it in a slightly different way. How much better on offense were the 2000-01 Bucks, 1996-97 Bulls, and 1995-96 Bulls in percentage terms?

TeamOffRtgLeague Off RtgPercent Better
2000-01 Bucks108.4103.05.24%
1996-97 Bulls114.4106.77.22%
1995-96 Bulls115.2107.67.06%

The league environment was not so different as to change the final analysis.

While we are in the area, I decided to conduct one additional relative comparison. NBA stats pioneer Dean Oliver identified “Four Factors of Basketball Success“: Shooting (40%), Turnovers (25%), Rebounding (20%), and Free Throws (15%). Let us compare the 2000-01 Bucks, 96-97 Bulls, and 95-96 Bulls in terms of the offensive four factors. We have effective field goal percentage (eFG%) which is field goal percentage with weighted three pointers, turnover percentage (TOV%), offensive rebound percentage (ORB%), and free throws per field goal attempt (FT/FGA).

First, their unadjusted four factors:

TeameFG%TOV%ORB%FT/FGA
2000-01 Bucks.49912.828.1.217
1996-97 Bulls.51112.535.9.199
1995-96 Bulls.51713.136.9.217

The 2000-01 Bucks were competitive with the two Bulls teams in Turnover Percentage and Free Throw rate. They were nowhere close in offensive rebounding percent (the Bulls, with Dennis Rodman, were a great offensive rebounding squad) and trailed a bit behind in effective field goal percentage. But what if we do what we did with relative offensive rating and compare their four factors stats to the league averages?

(Note: For turnover rate on my chart, positive values indicate having a lower turnover rate than league average.)

TeameFG%TOV%ORB%FT/FGA
2000-01 Bucks+.026+1.3-0.1-0.14
1996-97 Bulls+.018+2.3+5.1-0.37
1995-96 Bulls+.018+1.6+6.3-0.26

Mr. Caffey noted that the Bucks had great shooters. While their absolute effective field goal percentage was worse than the two Bulls teams we are looking at, they were better relative to the league average in 2000-01 than either of those Bulls squads. The Bucks were also better at getting to the free throw line than the Bulls, although all three teams in our sample were below average. Of course, we see a huge gap in both absolute and relative offensive rebounding rate between the Bulls squads and the Bucks, which likely benefited the Bulls’ effective field goal percentages and countered their low free throw rates. All three teams were well above average in taking care of the ball, but the Bulls (especially 1996-97) were better when adjusted for league-wide turnover rate.

I will note as a fun aside that the Bucks’ regular season four factors foreshadowed their defeat in the East Finals against the Philadelphia 76ers. In that series, the Sixers outscored the Bucks by two points over seven games (thanks in the end to a 17-point 108-91 win in game 7). The Bucks shot much better from the floor than the Sixers (eFG% .489 vs .426), but the Sixers took slightly better care of the ball (11.2 TOV% vs 13.4) and had big advantages on the offensive glass (34.4 to 27.4 ORB%) and free throws per field goal attempt (.241 vs .197), which was just enough to narrowly erase the Bucks’ better shooting over the course of a tough series.

Conclusion

I have better memories of the 2000-01 Bucks than the 1996-97 and 97-98 Bulls, due in no small part to the fact that I was a bit older for the Bucks (although I do have 1997-98 memories). I remember the Bucks as an excellent offensive team that probably should have defeated the Sixers in the East Finals (I remember watching them almost blow a huge lead in game six), but one can fairly note that both the Bucks and Sixers came perilously close to losing in the previous round (the Bucks came back from 2-3 down against the Charlotte Hornets, note those Charlotte Hornets were today’s New Orleans Pelicans and not today’s Charlotte Hornets, and the Sixers survived a close game-winning attempt miss by Vince Carter of the Toronto Raptors in game 7 of their second round series), so you can only survive by the skin of your teeth so many times before you do not. The Bucks did have the NBA’s most efficient offense that year relative to their peers, and one can make a fair statistical case that it was Hall of Famer Ray Allen’s finest individual season. Although the Bucks proved to be a one-hit wonder (missed the playoffs in 2001-02 and traded Ray Allen in 2002-03), it is fair to wonder whether the 2000-01 Bucks may have fared even better on offense (in absolute and relative terms) with the defensive rule changes implemented in 2004-05.

Ray Allen attempting a deep three against the Philadelphia 76ers in game 7 of the 2001 Eastern Conference Finals.
Ray Allen taking (and making) a three with the help of a screen set by Glenn Robinson in game 7 of the 2001 Eastern Conference Finals. Clipped from NBA YouTube Channel.

My cursory survey did not disabuse me of my initial hunch that the Bucks were not as good on offense as the 1995-96 and 1996-97 Bulls, although I did expect them to grade out better than the 1997-98 Bulls (we established the 97-98 Bulls had a mediocre offense for a championship squad in a prior survey). While I do not see a statistical case for the contrarian position that the 2000-01 Bucks were better than the 95-96/96-97 Bulls on offense, we did establish that they were at least competitive when adjusted for the league environment and were probably a better shooting team, all external factors being equal. While I did not assess Mr. Caffey’s assessment that the Bucks were more talented and I must owe some deference to someone who actually played with both teams, I would respectfully disagree on that point as well. But Mr. Caffey’s musing inspired a fun project which, if nothing else, highlights that the 2000-01 Bucks were an excellent offensive team, so much so that their offense came just one game short of carrying their below-average defense into the NBA Finals.